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NOTE
OUT OF MANY, ONE*: FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, DIVERSITY,
AND ARIZONA'S ENGLISH-ONLY LAW
INTRODUCTION
The American experiment continues to blend people of countless lands
into a rough democracy. Yet today, social, political, and economic forces
threaten common ground Americans once thought they shared. These forces
fuel a familiar debate about how to maintain a united society. "
Groups such as Arizonans for Official English (AOE)' argue that the best
way to prevent America from splintering is to restrict the use of non-English
languages.' Language restriction proponents assert that, without English as the
official language, America will become fractionalized and politically
unstable.' Opponents, however, argue that language restrictions are
unconstitutional, discriminatory, unnecessary, and un-American.4 Yniguez v.
Arizonans for Official English (Yniguez IV) 5  presents the conflicting
approaches to maintaining national unity.
Part I of this Note provides the legal and historical setting of Yniguez IV.
Part II summarizes the majority, the concurring, and dissenting opinions in the
case. Part III analyzes the majority's approach to the holding of the case and
presents alternative constitutional analyses. Finally, this Note concludes that
the majority in Yniguez IV reached a just outcome, albeit through an ill-chosen
constitutional rationale.
* E Pluribus Unum, the Latin phrase on some United States currency, is one that could not
be used by public officials under Arizona's English-only constitutional amendment.
1. AOE is a voter group comprised of Arizona citizens attempting to establish English as
the official language of their state's government. Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 69
F.3d 920, 924 (9th Cir. 1995) (en banc), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 1316 (1996) (Yniguez IV).
2. Some commentators and critical race theorists link the movement to establish language
restrictions to fears about increased immigration from Latin America. See, e.g., Michele Arington,
Note, English-Only Laws and Direct Legislation: The Battle in the States over Language Minority
Rights, 7 J.L. & POL. 325, 331 (1991).
In 1990, 43% of all foreign-born persons in the United States were Latinos from Mexico,
Central America, the Caribbean, and South America. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, PAmPHLET NO. 23-183, HIsPANIc AMERICANS TODAY 6 (1993). In addition, 50.7% of
the nationwide Latino foreign-bom population entered this country between 1980 and 1990. Id.
3. Arington, supra note 2, at 327. This fear is not new. In the early twentieth century, some
predicted that the United States would fall prey to linguistic minorities' attempt to establish their
own states. SIRLEY BRICE HEATH, LANGUAGE IN THE USA 8 (Charles A., Ferguson & Shirley
Brice Heath eds., 1981). Time has proven these predictions untrue.
4. See Arington, supra note 2, at 327-28, 337-51.
5. See 69 F.3d 920 (9th Cir. 1995) (en banc), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 1316 (1996).
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I. BACKGROUND
A. History
Since its inception, the United States has tolerated and at times
encouraged the use of foreign languages.6 For example, the Framers of the
United States Constitution did not establish a national language.7 Instead, the
Framers rejected a proposal by John Adams which would have established a
national academy to promote and standardize English as the uniform
language! The Framers rejected the proposal because it ran contrary to their
liberty ideal.9 American settlers spoke their native languages in their new
communities from the Colonial Period through the nineteenth century."
Society encouraged and valued bilingualism for its functional purpose."
American societal attitudes concerning languages took a sharp turn in the
early twentieth century. 2 States began to prohibit the use of languages other
than English. 3 The immigration wave that began in the 1800s in part sparked
these prohibitions. This wave included mostly Southern and Eastern
Europeans who differed ethnically from any prior immigrant group in the
United States.'5 The outbreak of World War I also contributed to a "patriotic
hysteria" that led to the imposition of language restrictions.' 6
In 1923, however, the Supreme Court in Meyer v. Nebraska7 struck
down state language restrictions by holding that a state statute prohibiting the
teaching of languages other than English to schoolchildren violated the
Constitution.' Four years later, in Farrington v. Tokushige,9 the Court
declared another statute unconstitutional because it singled out foreign
language schools for stringent government control."0 The Court declared these
English-only laws unconstitutional based on the Fourteenth Amendment's due
process and equal protection guarantees.2
Although both cases relied on substantive due process bases, Meyer and
Farrington remain binding precedent for constitutional challenges to "Official
English" laws.22 Over time, the Supreme Court recharacterized Meyer as a
6. HEATH, supra note 3, at 6-7.
7. Id. at 6.
8. Id.
9. Id.




14. See Arington, supra note 2, at 330.
15. Id.
16. Hiram Puig-Lugo, Freedom to Speak One Language: Free Speech and the English
Language Amendment, 11 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 35, 39 (1991).
17. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
18. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 400-03.
19. 273 U.S. 284 (1927).
20. Farrington, 273 U.S. at 298-99; see also Eng v. Trinidad, 271 U.S. 500, 508, 528 (1926)
(holding that a law that prohibited keeping accounting books in any language except English,
Spanish, or another local dialect was unconstitutional).
21. See Meyer, 262 U.S. at 402; Farrington, 273 U.S. at 299.
22. Yniguez IV, 69 F.3d at 945 n.29 (citing Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968);
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First Amendment protection case and viewed it, together with Bartels v.
Iowa," as a precursor to the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection
doctrine.24
In Meyer, the Supreme Court firmly established that restrictions on private
citizens' use of non-English languages unconstitutionally restrict their personal
liberty.25 Since Meyer and Farrington, courts have rarely examined the
constitutional issue presented when a state attempts to establish English as the
official language.26 In the past ten years, however, efforts to establish English
as the official language have re-emerged." At least twenty-one states and
over forty cities have enacted laws declaring English as their official state
language.28 In addition, the House of Representatives recently passed a bill
establishing English as the official language of the federal government.29
These current laws differ from the law at issue in Meyer because they do not
restrict private citizens' speech.3° Most of these laws are symbolic in that
they proclaim English to be. the official state language without declaring
restrictions on foreign language usage.3 Yet some of these laws do restrict
speech, most notably that of government employees. 2 Regardless of form,
these laws receive intense criticism while simultaneously garnering
considerable popular support.33
Halter v. Nebraska, 205 U.S. 34 (1907)).
23. 262 U.S. 404, 411 (1923) (holding that numerous state statutes mandating that students
be taught in English were unconstitutional).
24. Yniguez IV, 69 F.3d at 948 n.33 (discussing the link between the First Amendment and
the Equal Protection Clause); see also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965).
25. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 401.
26. Yniguez IV, 69 F.3d at 923.
27. See Juan F. Perea, Demography and Distrust: An Essay on American Languages,
Cultural Pluralism, and Official English, 77 MNN. L. REV. 269, 342 n.407 (1992).
28. Aaron Epstein, English as Official Language Faces High-Court Test, DENVER POST,
March 26, 1996, at 3A.
29. House OKs English-only Legislation, ARIZ. DAILY STAR, August 2, 1996, at IA. The bill
passed on a 259-169 vote, illustrating its overwhelming support. The bill repeals the bilingual
ballot requirements at federal elections. Id. The bill also requires the government to conduct all
business in English with limited exceptions. Id. One stated purpose for the bill is to facilitate
immigrants' acquisition of English. Id. However, throughout history, immigrants have followed a
successful pattern of language acquisition without the existence of English-only laws. See Puig-
Lugo, supra note 16, at 48; see also HEATH, supra note 3, at 469-83.
30. See, e.g., ARIz. CONST. art. XXVIII, § 1.
31. See Perea, supra note 27, at 367 (discussing the adverse impact of "symbolic" Official
English laws). California passed one of the many symbolic Official English laws. See CAL.
CONST. art. I1, § 6. The law declares English as the official state language without specifically
prohibiting the use of foreign languages by private citizens or government officials. Id.
32. Yniguez IV, 69 F.3d at 924. "English-only" laws are laws which impose speech
restrictions, as opposed to the symbolic "Official English" laws. This Note will focus specifically
on the English-only law passed in Arizona. The legal, political, and societal issues connected to
Official English laws are beyond the scope of this Note.
33. See Perea, supra note 27, at 361-62 (discussing the difference between the popularity
and constitutionality of such laws).
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B. Restrictions on the Speech of Government Employees
The current focus on restricting government employees' speech enjoys
more legal support than the approach that the court used in Meyer. For
example, in O'Conner v. Ortega,34 the Supreme Court established a general
principle that government can restrict the freedoms of its employees more than
those of private citizens. 5 More specifically, in Waters v. Churchill,36 the
Court ruled that government employees are subject to stricter speech
restrictions than private citizens when the government imposes those
restrictions for reasons of effectiveness and efficiency.37
Yet, the Supreme Court uniformly rejected the theory that an employer
may subject public employees to any conditions an employer wishes,
regardless of the constitutionality or reasonableness of those conditions.3"
Nevertheless, the government's power to restrict the speech of its employees
remains substantial. The Waters/Pickering line of cases39 spells out when and
what speech restrictions a government employer may place on its employees.
In the first case of the Waters/Pickering line, Pickering v. Board of
Education,'  a public high school teacher wrote a letter to the editor
criticizing the school board's handling of a bond issue and allocation of
financial resources." The Court held that the teacher's comments were
entitled to First Amendment protection, because the teacher spoke as a private
citizen on a matter of public concern.42
Fifteen years after Pickering, the Supreme Court ruled in Connick v.
Myers43 that when a public employee speaks as a private citizen about an
issue of personal interest, government employers are afforded wide latitude in
deciding whether to allow the speech.' The Connick decision established that
employers may restrict public employee speech when the speech is not based
on matters of public concern.4' The Court suggested that political and social
issues constitute matters of public concern.' Notwithstanding this suggestion,
the Court firmly stated that the "content, form, and context" of a given
34. 480 U.S. 709 (1987).
35. See O'Conner, 480 U.S. at 725; see also Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 248-49
(1976) (affirming a county's determination that a regulation limiting police officers' hair length
does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment); United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n
of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 556 (1973) (holding that a regulation of partisan political
activities as applied to federal employees does not violate the First Amendment).
36. 114 S. Ct. 1878 (1994) (plurality opinion).
37. See Waters, 114 S. Ct. at 1888.
38. See Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 602-04 (1967).
39. The WaterslPickering line of cases includes United States v. National Treasury Employ-
ees Union, 115 S. Ct. 1003 (1995); Waters, 114 S. Ct. 1878; Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378
(1987); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983); and Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563
(1968).
40. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
41. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 566.
42. Id. at 574.
43. 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
44. Connick, 461 U.S. at 146-47.
45. Id. at 147.
46. Id. at 146.
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statement are important when determining if a statement addresses a matter of
public concern.47
In Rankin v. McPherson,' a county employee's statement that she hoped
another presidential assassination attempt would succeed constituted a matter
of public concern.' The Court further determined that the public's interest in
hearing the information should be weighed against the government's interests
of promoting efficiency and effectiveness.' The Court found the comment
commanded First Amendment protection, because the employee's right to
speak on matters of public concern outweighed the government's interests.5'
In Waters, a nurse conveyed unflattering information concerning the
obstetrics department to another nurse considering transferring into the
department. 2 Consequently, the hospital discharged her.53 The nurse alleged
that her speech was protected pursuant to the holding in Connick.54 The Court
affirmed that the state's efficiency interests did not outweigh the government
employee speech that constituted matters of public concern.55
In the most recent case of the series, United States v. National Treasury
Employees Union,56  executive branch employees challenged the
constitutionality of a subsection in the Ethics in Government Act which
prohibited government employees from receiving honoraria.57 The Court ruled
that the employees' activities meriting honoraria were the actions of public
employees speaking as private citizens about matters of public concern and
that as a result the activities were entitled to First Amendment protection."
In summary, the Waters/Pickering line of cases stands for the principle
that when a public employee speaks on a matter of public concern, and the
state interests of promoting efficiency and effectiveness do not outweigh the
speech, the speech commands First Amendment protection. Otherwise, the
government has wide latitude in restricting its employees' speech, especially
when the speech pertains to an internal work or personal matter.
Today, if government employee speech does not fall within the
Waters/Pickering category of protected speech, a plaintiff can successfully
challenge an English-only law based on a wide range of legal theories. These
theories include the First Amendment right to freedom of speech, the Four-
teenth Amendment's equal protection guarantee, and the right to vote.
47. Id. at 147-48.
48. 483 U.S. 378 (1987).
49. Rankin, 483 U.S. at 381, 386.
50. Id. at 388.
51. Id. at 392.
52. Waters, 114 S. Ct. at 1882.
53. Id. at 1883.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1884.
56. 115 S. Ct. 1003 (1995).
57. National Treasury, 115 S. Ct. at 1009-10.
58. Id. at 1013.
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C. First Amendment Protection of Public Employee Speech
The First Amendment protects the fundamental right to freedom of
speech.59 Because the freedom of speech is a fundamental right, when a state
regulates speech it must do so with extreme caution.' Absent such caution, a
state may carelessly enact an overbroad statute regulating speech protected by
the First Amendment. An overbroad statute attempts to restrict unprotected
speech but erroneously applies to protected speech as well.6 The overbreadth
doctrine permits a plaintiff with constitutional standing to challenge a law's
facial application to others who are not before the court, but whose speech
commands First Amendment protection.62 In addition, the law facing
challenge must be substantially overbroad and a court must not be able to
construe it in such as way as to cure any potentially unconstitutional
applications.63
In Bond v. Floyd,'4 the Court recognized that language restriction laws
that apply to all government employees risk invalidation under the overbreadth
doctrine simply because of their application to legislators' speech.65 Under
Bond, "[t]he central commitment of the First Amendment... requires that
legislators be given the widest latitude to express their views on issues of
policy."' In Bond, the Court relied on this principle when it held that legis-
lators should not be subject to stricter speech standards than private citizens.67
Prohibiting restrictions on legislators' speech honors the principle set forth in
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan' that "debate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust, and wide open."
D. The Right to Vote
English-only laws that restrict legislators' speech potentially violate sec-
tion 2 of the federal Voting Rights Act.7" Congress enacted the original
Voting Rights Act of 1965"' primarily to combat discrimination against
African-American voters.72 The Act intended to "do something about
59. U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
60. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTrrTrUIONAL LAW § 16.8, at 996 (5th
ed. 1995).
61. See id.
62. Board of Airport Comm'rs v. Jews for Jesus, 482 U.S. 569, 574 (1987).
63. See Virginia v. American Booksellers Ass'n, 484 U.S. 383, 397 (1988) (recognizing
established First Amendment law that, when a law is subject to a narrowing construction which
would make it constitutional, the court will uphold the statute); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S.
601, 615 (1973) (holding that a law is overbroad if its overbreadth is both "real" and "substantial"
when compared to its legitimate sweep). A party may challenge a statute on the same basis when
it prohibits constitutionally protected conduct. See Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615.
64. 385 U.S. 116 (1966).
65. Bond, 385 U.S. at 135-36.
66. Id. at 136.
67. Id. at 132-33.
68. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
69. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 270.
70. Voting Rights Act § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a)-(b) (1982).
71. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 445 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973bb-1 (1994)).
72. See Note, 'Official English': Federal Limits on Efforts to Curtail Bilingual Services in
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accumulated wrongs and the continuance of the wrongs." ' In 1975, Congress
officially recognized the existence of discrimination against language
minorities by amending the Voting Rights Act to require bilingual voting
materials in specific jurisdictions.74 Congress found a systematic pattern of
discrimination against language minorities in education, voting, and almost
every other facet of life.75 Congress concluded that this discrimination
effectively excluded language minorities from participation in the electoral
process.76 Furthermore, the Senate record suggested that states take steps
beyond prohibiting English-only elections in order to ensure language
minorities access to voting and registration.77 These steps included addressing
the adverse impact of language minorities voting in all-white areas and
minorities' subjection to "law enforcement surveillance. 78
Congress further amended the Voting Rights Act in 1982.7' The Supreme
Court decision in City of Mobile v. Bolden"° broke from precedent, spurring
the 1982 amendments.8 In Mobile, the Court required plaintiffs to prove that
a voting practice intended to deny equal political opportunity and diluted
voting power.82 The amendments restored legal precedent by relaxing the
the States, 100 HARv. L. REV. 1345, 1350 (1987).
73. Cal G. Gonzales, Comment, "Ability to Influence" Claims Under Section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act, 13 CHICANo-LATINO L. REv. 96, 113 (1993) (quoting Senator Jacob Javits).
74. Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended by Act of Aug. 6, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-73, 89
Stat. 400 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-la(b) (1994)). The Voting Rights Act
requires bilingual materials in jurisdictions where: (1) more than five percent of voting age
citizens are members of a single language minority or are Native Americans living on a
reservation and have limited-English proficiency; and (2) the rate of illiteracy of the language
minority group is higher than the national rate. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-la(b)(2) (1994).
75. S. REP. No. 94-295, at 29 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 774, 795-96.
76. S. REP. No. 94-295, at 30 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 774, 796.
77. S. REP. No. 94-295, at 34 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 774, 801.
78. Id.
79. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 134. As amended,
42 U.S.C. § 1973 states in relevant part:
(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice or
procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a manner
which results in a denial or abridgment of the right of any citizen in the United States to
vote on account of race or color, or in contravention of the guarantees set forth in §
1973b(f)(2) of this title as provided in subsection (b) of this section.
(b) A violation of subsection (a) of this section is established if, based on the totality
of circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or
election in the State or political subdivision are not equally open to participation by
members of a class of citizens protected by subsection (a) of this section in that its
members have less opportunity then other members of the electorate to participate in the
political process and to elect representatives of their choice.
42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1994).
Section 1973b(f)(2) states:
No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice or procedure shall
be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision to deny or abridge the right
of any citizen of the United States to vote because he is a member of a language
minority group.
42 U.S.C. § 1973b(f)(2) (1994).
80. 466 U.S. 55 (1980).
81. See Mobile, 446 U.S. 55 (1980); White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973); Zimmer v.
McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1973), affd sub nom. East Carroll Parish Sch. Bd. v.
Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976); Kirksey v. Board of Supervisors, 554 F.2d 139 (5th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 434 U.S. 968 (1977).
82. Mobile, 446 U.S. at 66 (stating that the purpose of legislative apportionments must be to
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Mobile intent standard to the less stringent results standard.83  The
amendments therefore required only that language minorities prove, by the
totality of the circumstances,84 that the practice at issue results in an unequal
opportunity to participate in the political process.85
The Court interpreted the 1982 Voting Rights Act amendments for the
first time in Thornburg v. Gingles.s6 In Thornburg, plaintiffs challenged
North Carolina's multi-member, at-large districting system.' The Court
limited its discussion to districting schemes and outlined three conditions that
a plaintiff must meet in order to prevail under section 2 with a multi-member
districting claim. 8
E. Equal Protection
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that
the government treat similarly situated persons in a similar manner.89 More-
minimize minorities' voting potential).
83. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (1994).
84. The Senate report on the amendment outlined typical factors which could prove that
plaintiffs do not have "equal opportunit[ies] to participate in the political processes." S. REP. No.
97-417, at 28 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 206. The Senate report clearly stated
that the factors listed in the report were not necessarily dispositive, not required to be present in
any particular number, and could possibly be replaced by other factors depending on the practice
called into question. S. REP. No. 97-417, at 28-29 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177,
206-07.
Typical factors include:
1. the extent of any history of official discrimination in the state or political subdivision
that touched the right of the members of the minority group to register, to vote, or
otherwise to participate in the democratic process;
2. the extent to which voting in the elections of the state or political subdivision is
racially polarized;
3. the extent to which the state or political subdivision has used unusually large election
districts, [or] majority vote requirements ... that may enhance the opportunity for
discrimination against the minority group;
4. if there is a candidate slating process, whether the members of the minority group
have been denied access to that process;
5. the extent to which members of the minority group in the state or political subdivision
bear the effects of discrimination in such areas as education, employment and health,
which hinder their ability to participate effectively in the political process;
6. whether political campaigns have been characterized by overt or subtle racial appeals;
7. the extent to which members of the minority group have been elected to public office
in the jurisdiction.
Id.
Additional factors ... are:
whether there is a significant lack of responsiveness on the part of elected officials to
the particularized needs of the members of the minority group.
whether the policy underlying the state or political subdivision's use of such voting
qualification, prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice or procedure is tenuous.
Id.
85. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a)-(b) (1994).
86. 478 U.S. 30, 34 (1986).
87. Thornburg, 478 U.S. at 46.
88. Id. at 50-51. The conditions require that a minority group show that: (1) it is "suffi-
ciently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district"; (2)
it is politically cohesive; and (3) the majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to defeat the minority
group's preferred candidate. Id.
89. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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over, the Equal Protection Clause guarantees that government classifications
"will not be based upon impermissible criteria or arbitrarily used to burden a
group of individuals."' A plaintiff may therefore challenge an English-only
law under the Equal Protection Clause.
When faced with an equal protection claim, courts apply one of three
standards of review. Laws which specifically apply to suspect classes receive
strict scrutiny, the most heightened level of review." Strict scrutiny requires
that the law in question be narrowly tailored to further a compelling govern-
mental interest.92 The second standard of review is the intermediate test,
which courts have formally employed for gender and illegitimacy
classifications.93 When applying an intermediate review, courts require that
the government show an important interest, and the law at issue substantially
relate to the state's proposed interests.94 When a law does not affect a
fundamental right, and the law applies to a group of people who do not
command special protection, courts employ the third standard of review: the
rationality test.95 Under the rationality test, the court asks whether the law
bears a rational relationship to a legitimate government end.96
Language restriction laws will most likely receive either strict scrutiny
review or rationality review, depending on the way in which the reviewing
court chooses to characterize the aggrieved group(s).97 Since a language
classification is not a per se suspect class, a plaintiff may establish that an
English-only law is subject to strict scrutiny by showing that language acts as
a proxy for national origin.9" If the court refuses to accept this proxy, a
90. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 60, § 14.2, at 597.
91. Daniel J. Garfield, Comment, Don't Box Me In: The Unconsitutionality of Amendment 2
and English-Only Amendments, 89 Nw. U. L. REv. 690, 706 (1995); see also Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (applying a strict scrutiny review to racial classifications); United
States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). Suspect classes are classes based
on race, alienage, and national origin. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954)
(applying strict scrutiny to a situation involving a suspect class).
92. Garfield, supra note 91, at 706-07.
93. See, e.g., Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 730 (1982) (holding
that a state-funded nursing school policy denying men admission violated the Equal Proiection
Clause because it did not substantially relate to its proposed objective); Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S.
259, 275-76 (1978) (holding that a New York illegitimacy statute was constitutional because it
substantially related to state interests). The Court has informally extended intermediate scrutiny to
other areas of the law by not declaring a formal standard of review. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S.
202 (1982). This expansion led some to argue that language-based classifications also deserve
heightened scrutiny and should be subject to intermediate scrutiny. Note, supra note 72, at 1353-
54 (1987).
In this case, language minorities would be classified as "quasi-suspect" classes. See id. at
1353-56. Courts have rejected "quasi-suspect" class analyses when language minorities sought an
affirmative right to governmental services and information. See, e.g., Soberal-Perez v. Heckler,
717 F.2d 36, 41-42 (2d Cir. 1983). Notwithstanding, the denial of existing government services
based on language presents courts with an opportunity to apply a heightened standard of review
without requiring a proven link between language and national origin.
94. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198 (1976).
95. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 60, § 14.3, at 601.
96. Id.
97. See Arington, supra note 2, at 335-36.
98. See Yniguez IV, 69 F.3d at 947-48; see also Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 486 &
nn.5-6 (1977) (equating the usage of the Spanish language with people with Spanish surnames or
who are Mexican-American).
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plaintiff must argue that the English-only law bears no rational relationship to
a legitimate governmental interest."
II. YNIGUEZ V. ARIZONANS FOR OFFICIAL ENGLISH
A. Facts
In 1988, a majority of Arizona citizens passed, by ballot initiative, an
amendment to their state constitution proclaiming English as the official
language of Arizona. °° Article XXVIII ("the article" or "the amendment"),
also prohibited the government, with limited exceptions, from using any
language other than English.' The amendment states in part that "[t]his
State and all political subdivisions of this State shall act in English and in no
other language."'0 2
Maria-Kelley F. Yniguez worked as a government employee in the
Arizona Department of Administration when the amendment passed. 3
Yniguez spoke English and Spanish fluently and used both languages to
process medical malpractice claims for monolingual English and Spanish
speaking claimants prior to the amendment's passage."° Following adoption
of the amendment, Yniguez stopped speaking Spanish at work to avoid
employment sanctions. 5 Shortly thereafter, Yniguez filed suit in federal
district court arguing that the amendment violated her rights under the First
and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution."° The federal
district court did not reach Yniguez's Fourteenth Amendment claim, but held
that the amendment unconstitutionally violated her free speech guarantee under
the First Amendment." The state did not appeal." s Consequently, AOE,
the official sponsors of the amendment, moved to intervene to appeal the
99. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 60, § 14.3 at 601.
100. Yniguez IV, 69 F.3d at 924; ARIZ. CONST. art. XXVIII, §§ 1-4.
101. ARtz. CONST. art. XXVIU § 3 (allowing the state to act in a non-English language when:
(1) teaching English to non-proficient English speakers; (2) complying with federal laws; (3)
teaching a foreign language course; (4) protecting public health or safety; and (5) protecting
criminal defendants' and crime victims' rights).
102. Id. § 3(l)(a).
103. Yniguez IV, 69 F.3d at 924.
104. Id. In addition to Yniguez, the amendment affected tens of thousands of others. The
United States ranks as the fourth largest Spanish speaking country in the world following three
others: Mexico, Spain, and Colombia, all of whose dominant national language is Spanish. Puig-
Lugo, supra note 16, at 47. Approximately 80% of the children enrolled in bilingual programs are
Spanish speakers. Id. Out of the 310 jurisdictions required to provide multilingual ballots, Spanish
speakers are the dominant linguistic majority in 281. Id. at 47-48. Furthermore, 97% of Spanish
speakers are of Latino origin. Id. Arizona claims the fourth largest population of Latino residents
in the United States. See Epstein, supra note 28, at 3A.
Nineteen percent of all Arizona residents are of Latino origin. Id. Relevant demographic
figures are as follows: 18.78% of the Arizona population are of Latino origin, 14.17% are Spanish
speaking, and 50.7% of the nationwide foreign born population entered this country between 1980
and 1990. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, PAMPHLET No. 23-183, HISPANIC
AMERICANS TODAY (1993).
105. Yniguez IV, 69 F.3d at 924.
106. Yniguez v. Moffard, 730 F. Supp. 309, 310 (D. Ariz. 1990).
107. Yniguez v. Arizona, 939 F.2d 727, 730 (9th Cir. 1991) (Yniguez 1).
108. Yniguez IV, 69 F.3d at 926.
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district court's ruling, but the court denied the motion."° The Ninth Circuit
reversed the district court's denial of AOE's motion and allowed AOE to
intervene as plaintiffs."'
On appeal, a three-judge panel unanimously affirmed the district court's
decision to strike down the amendment."' The Ninth Circuit reheard the case
en banc and affirmed the previous decision."2 The court rereleased the
unanimous three-judge panel opinion with only minor changes, and reaffirmed
Article XXVIII violated the First Amendment." 3 On March 25, 1996, the
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari."4 In addition to the
questions set forth in the petition, the Court will consider whether AOE pos-
sesses the requisite standing for the action and whether the action involves a
case or controversy regarding Yniguez. "'
B. Majority Opinion
In striking down Article XXVIII, the Ninth Circuit rested its holding on
the First Amendment." 6 The majority accepted the federal district court's
broad construction of the article and applied an overbreadth analysis.' The
court ruled that a limiting construction would be at odds with the article's
plain meaning and would require performing a "face lift" upon the
amendment. "' The majority also determined that the amendment should be
invalidated as a whole if one part were found unconstitutional, as the article
did not contain a severability clause."9
Once the court determined that the amendment could not be severed, it
proceeded to analyze whether the amendment was unconstitutionally
overbroad. 2 The majority reasoned that Yniguez properly brought an
overbreadth challenge because the amendment potentially restricted the free
speech rights of all public employees and officials. 2' The court also stated
that the article was subject to facial invalidation because it broadly related to a
single subject and was based on a single premise.'22
109. Id.
110. Yniguez 1, 939 F.2d at 740 (additionally allowing the Attorney General to intervene for
the purpose of arguing the merits of the case).
111. Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 42 F.3d 1217, 1243 (9th Cir. 1994)
(unanimous decision).
112. Yniguez IV, 69 F.3d at 924.
113. Id.
114. Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 116 S. Ct. 1316 (1996).
115. Id.
116. Yniguez IV, 69 F.3d at 924.
117. Id. at 931-32.
118. Id. at 931.
119. Id. at 933 (citing Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 427 U.S. 491, 506 (1985)). A
severability clause is a statutory provision which allows the balance of a statute to remain intact if
one part is declared unconstitutional. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1343 (6th ed. 1990) (defining
saving clause).
120. Yniguez IV, 69 F.3d at 931-32.
121. Id. at 932.
122. id. at 932-33.
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The majority then disposed of two arguments put forth by AOE.'23 AOE
argued that the amendment regulated conduct and consequently did not
implicate free speech protections. 2 4 The court disagreed, stating that because
the meaning of words and phrases vary in different languages, language
rcstrictions compromise the meaning of spoken words.'25 AOE also argued
that Yniguez sought the affirmative right to require that government operate in
foreign languages.'26 The court rejected this argument by differentiating
between an affirmative and a negative right.'27 While acknowledging that
non-English speakers are not affirmatively entitled to government services in
their native languages, the majority concluded that Yniguez did not attempt to
compel the government to provide multilingual information. 2 Instead,
Yniguez rightfully sought to enforce the negative right: to prohibit the gagging
ot governmental employees.'29 Thus, on a basic level, the court distinguished
between requiring government officials to speak in a foreign language and
allowing them to do so.
In its analysis of the potentially unconstitutional restriction on free speech
rights, the court distinguished between public employees and private citizens.
The majority acknowledged that while Arizona has a constitutional right to
impose stricter restrictions on public employees' free speech rights than those
of private citizens,'30 the state cannot arbitrarily impose such restrictions sim-
ply because the government is the employer. 3 ' The court concluded that
Yniguez's speech did not fit into the protected category of speech by a private
citizen on a matter of public concern.'32 Nor did the speech fit into the
category of a public employee's speech on a personal matter.'33 Relying on
the fact that the recipient motivated the foreign language communication, the
court found the speech to be "unquestionably of public import," requiring
analysis under the Waters/Pickering line of cases.'34
The court concluded that public employees' speech interests outweighed
Arizona's alleged state interests of promoting civic unity, encouraging a
common language, and protecting public confidence.'35  Although it
recognized the importance of national unity and democracy, the court relied on
Meyer and Farrington to hold that Article XXVIII was an inappropriate
123. Id. at 934-37.
124. Id. at 934.
125. Id. at 935.
126. Id. at 936.
127. Id. at 936-37.
128. Id. at 936. The majority's analysis of affirmative versus negative rights should not be
read to apply to situations where federal law or the Constitution mandate foreign language
services. For example, criminal defendants, as acknowledged by Article XXVIII itself, are entitled
to the affirmative right of foreign language assistance. See ARiz. CONST. art. XXVII, § 3(2)(e).
129. Yniguez IV, 69 F.3d at 936.
130. Id. at 938 (citing Waters, 114 S. Ct. 1878; Rankin, 483 U.S. 378; Connick, 461 U.S.
138; Pickering, 391 U.S. 563).
131. Id.
132. Id. at 939.
133. See id.
134. Id. at 939-42.
135. Id. at 944-45 (citing National Treasury, 115 S. Ct. at 1015-18, and Rutan v. Republican
Party, 497 U.S. 62, 70 n.4 (1990)).
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approach to promoting these interests. 3 6 In addition, the state's interests in
efficiency and effectiveness were "wholly absent."'37 Based upon this
analysis, the court concluded that Article XXVIII's restriction of public
employees' speech rights rendered it unconstitutionally overbroad. 3
C. Concurring Opinion: Judge Brunetti
Judge Brunetti wrote separately to state that the restriction on an elected
official's speech would, by itself, be a sufficient basis to find that Article
XXVIII was facially overbroad and unconstitutional.'39  Judge Brunetti
reasoned that because "[clommunication between candidates and voters is at
the core of all political action," Article XXVIII's interference with that
communication represented an attempt to manipulate the political process."
Judge Brunetti also argued that Article XXVIII interfered with voting and
political representation and chilled elected officials' speech. 4' Judge Brunetti
cited Bond v. Floyd'42 to support the proposition that Article XXVIII
interfered with incumbent candidates' ability to communicate with voters
during re-election."'
D. Dissenting Opinion: Judge Fernandez
Judge Fernandez began by acknowledging that Article XXVIII was
subject to a broad construction, and that arbitrary conditions cannot be applied
to public employment.'" Judge Fernandez argued that Yniguez's speech
rights were not restricted, because her speech occurred while she performed
official duties. 45 Judge Fernandez agreed with the majority that Yniguez's
situation was not easily characterized as either that of a public employee
speaking out as a citizen on a matter of public concern or as an employee
speaking on matters of personal interest."4 However, Judge Fernandez
asserted that the Yniguez IV case was more like a private concern speech case,
because Yniguez decided for her own private reasons not to obey the state
constitution. 47 Consequently, Judge Fernandez reasoned that Yniguez did not
have a constitutional right to speak Spanish on the job."4
136. See id. at 945 (citing Farrington, 273 U.S. 284 and Meyer, 262 U.S. 390).
137. Id. at 942.
138. Id. at 947.
139. Id. at 950 (Brunetti, J., concurring).
140. Id. at 950-51.
141. Id. at 951.
142. 385 U.S. 116 (1966) (holding that the disqualification of an elected legislator because of
his statements to the media opposing the Vietnam War violated the legislator's right to freedom of
speech under the First Amendment).
143. Yniguez IV, 60 F.3d at 950-51 (Brunetti, J., concurring).
144. Id. at 955 (Fernandez, J., dissenting).
145. See id.
146. Id. at 956.
147. Id.
148. See id. at 957.
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For the sake of argument, Judge Fernandez also agreed that choice of
language constituted speech. 49 Judge Fernandez asserted that because the
government has a right to control the messages communicated to the public
and language usage determines what messages are communicated, the
government has a right to disallow foreign language communication.'
E. Dissenting Opinion: Chief Judge Wallace
Chief Judge Wallace joined Judge Fernandez in dissent and wrote
separately to argue that the majority misclassified the choice of language
communication as speech instead of conduct. 5' To support this argument,
the Chief Judge referred to the lack of case authority in the majority opinion
supporting the assertion that language is, in and of itself, speech.'52 Although
he agreed that a percentage of Arizonans would probably prefer to speak
Spanish with a public employee, the Chief Judge rejected this as a valid basis
to evoke First Amendment protections.'53 Chief Judge Wallace also asserted
that the majority ruled contrary to case authority in determining that Yniguez's
on the job communication constituted a matter of public concern."'
F. Dissenting Opinion: Judge Kozinski
Because Judge Kozinski believed the amendment might well be
unconstitutional, his dissent focused on the majority's approach rather than its
conclusion. 55 The judge faulted the majority for using the Waters/Pickering
line of cases where it did not apply.'56 According to Judge Kozinski, Yniguez
IV had nothing in common with the Waters/Pickering cases.' Judge
Kozinski distinguished Yniguez IV by noting that the speech at issue occurred
when public employees performed official duties,' arguing that when an
employee spoke to fulfill an official duty, the employee did not possess an
interest in the speech.'59 Instead, Judge Kozinski suggested that the employee
communicated solely a government message." The judge then predicted that
the Yniguez IV decision will be a costly one, because the courts will be subject
to a flood of litigation by disgruntled public employees who have no grounds
for a constitutional challenge.' Judge Kozinski suggested that an equal
protection challenge would be more successful and appropriate. 62
149. See id.
150. Id.
151. See id. at 959 (Wallace, C-1., dissenting).
152. Id.
153. Id. at 960.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 963 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).




160. Id. at 961-62.
161. Id. at 963.
162. Id. (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
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G. Special Concurrence: Judge Reinhardt
In addition to writing the majority opinion, Judge Reinhardt wrote
specially in response to Judge Kozinski's dissenting opinion.'63 The special
concurrence criticized Judge Kozinski's dissent for its mean-spiritedness and
absence of concern for the less fortunate."'6 Additionally, Judge Reinhardt
accused Judge Kozinski of placing government powers beyond constitutional
reach by asserting that the government can require public employees to say
anything in the course of their official duties.'65 Judge Reinhardt warned that
if Judge Kozinski's views became law, government employees would be
forced to relay hateful slogans and messages to non-English speakers.'" At
the same time, non-English speakers would be relegated to second class
citizenship as a result of the deprivation of information necessary to fulfill
basic life functions.' 67
III. ANALYSIS
A. Free Speech: A Just Ruling Based on Shaky Ground
Unfortunately, the Ninth Circuit failed to recognize Yniguez IV as a case
of first impression. Instead, as discussed above, the court relied on the
Waters/Pickering series to support its holding that Article XXVIII violated the
First Amendment. The Waters/Pickering line of cases, however, established
First Amendment protections for an entirely different type of speech than that
restricted by Article XXVIII. When the court forced the restricted speech in
Yniguez IV into the Waters/Pickering line, it attempted to put a square peg in a
round hole.
As Judge Fernandez correctly stated in his dissent, the Waters/Pickering
line of cases "look[s] to the content of public employee speech to see whether
it contributes to public debate."'" For example, the most recent case in the
Waters/Pickering line, National Treasury Employees Union found that the
challenged speech deserved constitutional protection because it was "addressed
to a public audience, made outside the workplace, and involved content largely
unrelated to their government employment."'" Moreover, the other cases in
the Waters/Pickering line did not protect speech that occurred as part of an
official duty.' 70 Yet the Ninth Circuit majority insisted on forcing the
restricted speech of Arizona public employees into this category.'
7'
Classifying the speech as "unquestionably of public import" served an
important purpose for the majority. It allowed the majority to base its ruling
163. Id. at 952 (Reinhardt, J., concurring specially).
164. See id. at 952-53.
165. Id. at 953.
166. Id. at 954.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 960 (Fernandez, J., dissenting).
169. National Treasury, 115 S. Ct. at 1013.
170. See supra notes 39-58 and accompanying text.
171. See Yniguez IV, 69 F.3d at 939.
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on a widely accepted and legally sound body of law addressing public
employee speech restrictions. If the court had correctly described the speech as
a tool to communicate a government message, it would have had little case
law to support its holding.' In addition, the majority admitted that the
government generally can regulate the messages its employees communicate to
the public."' "To say that in most circumstances the government may
regulate content by compelling or prohibiting on-the-job delivery of a
particular message is a truism." '
Unfortunately, forcing public employees' restricted speech into a category
in which it did not belong confused the doctrine of constitutionally protected
public employee speech, downplayed the amendment's egregious impact on
elected officials' First Amendment rights, and subjected the court's just
conclusion to criticism and skepticism. The dissenters presented cogent
arguments that the majority could have defeated by finding the amendment
unconstitutional as it specifically applied to legislators' speech rights.
B. A Just Ruling Based on Solid Ground
The court in Yniguez IV correctly concluded that the amendment was "not
a valid regulation of the speech of public employees and is unconstitutionally
overbroad.""' 5 However, the court erred in the approach it used to reach its
conclusion. While the court properly outlined the First Amendment
overbreadth doctrine, it should have declared the amendment unconstitutional
based specifically on its application to legislators' speech rights.
76
The court in Yniguez IV acknowledged that the amendment is the most
restrictive English-only law to date. 77 The majority should have followed
that acknowledgement with an adequate analysis of the article's most clearly
unconstitutional application: the restriction of legislators' speech rights.
Adequate representation requires open communication with constituents
about their needs, desires, and expectations."7' Restricting legislators' speech
rights impairs their ability to fulfill their obligations.' Such restrictions
"undermin[e] the 'public good' by interfering with the rights of the people to
representation in the democratic process."'' 0 One fundamental principle of
172. Id. at 940 (stating that "there are few First Amendment precedents in this area" when
discussing constitutional regulation of employee speech used to convey a government message).
173. Id. at 939-40. See generally Rosenberger v. University of Virginia, 115 S. Ct. 2510,
2518-19 (1995) (recognizing that the government is entitled to regulate government-subsidized
private party speech); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194 (1991) (recognizing that a government
is entitled to say what it wants through a private party when the private party's speech is
subsidized by the government).
174. See Yniguez IV, 69 F.3d at 940 n.24.
175. Id.
176. See, e.g., id. at 950 (Brunetti, J., concurring) (writing separately "to emphasize that the
article's unconstitutional effect on Arizona's elected officials would alone be sufficient reason to
strike the provision down.").
177. See id. at 927 (citing Arington, supra note 2, at 337).
178. See Bond, 385 U.S. at 136-37.
179. See id.
180. Spallone v. United States, 493 U.S. 265, 279 (1990) (discussing legislative immunity
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the electoral system is that legislators and constituents should engage in free
and uninhibited political exchange.' Legislators' speech protections exist in
part to "bring about political and social changes desired by the people.' ' 2
Restricting legislators' usage of Spanish, for example, would prevent at least
one notable constituency in Arizona-monolingual Spanish speakers-from
engaging in political debate and communication with their elected
representatives. Therefore, the amendment's overly broad restriction on the
speech of legislators alone should have rendered it unconstitutional.
A holding incorporating the constitutionally protected conduct precedent
would have strengthened the court's position by sufficiently addressing the
concerns raised by Chief Judge Wallace. 3 The majority could and should
have relied on binding authority which states that an overbreadth analysis is
appropriate when constitutionally protected conduct is at issue. 4
C. Article XXVIII's Violation of the Voting Rights Act
1. Restriction of Legislators' Speech Rights
By restricting legislators' speech rights, the amendment compromised
language minorities' political participation and therefore violated section 2 of
the Voting Rights Act. 5 Congress intended the Voting Rights Act to protect
a broad notion of the political process.'86 The legislative history of the
amendment, the cases upon which Congress relied when amending the
from imposition of court sanctions).
181. See Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369-70 (1931) (finding unconstitutional a
statute which criminally penalized the display of a red flag because the statute infringed upon
"free political discussion"); see also Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-76 (1927)
(Brandeis, J., concurring) (stating that a fundamental principle of our American government is the
fulfillment of the political duty which is to engage in public discussion), overruled on alternative
grounds by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
182. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) (discussing freedom of speech and
press).
183. Any holding which invalidated Article XXVIII on First Amendment grounds would be
subject to criticism by Chief Judge Wallace. Chief Judge Wallace argued in dissent that language
restrictions pertain to conduct, not speech, and consequently are not entitled to First Amendment
protection. Yniguez IV, 69 F.3d at 959 (Wallace, C.J., dissenting). The majority inadequately
addressed Wallace's criticism by responding with a circular argument that "[I]anguage is by
definition speech." Id. at 935.
184. See Broadrick, 413 U.S. 601. In Broadrick, the Supreme Court reasserted that a facial
overbreadth claim is appropriate when a statute regulates the "manner of expressive or
communicative conduct." Id. at 612-13; see also Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 114
(1972). Communication which creates a "'cognitive content' in the listener" or expresses an idea
qualifies as protected conduct. See Eliot F. Krieger, Protected Expression: Toward a Speaker-
Oriented Theory, 73 DENVER U. L. REV. 69, 73 (1995). Spanish language communication, for
example, creates cognitive content in a monolingual Spanish listener different from that created by
English communication. As demonstrated, language meets the test for expressive conduct.
Therefore, even if Judge Wallace were correct, language still is entitled to First Amendment
protection.
185. Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1994).
186. Kathryn Abrams, "Raising Politics Up": Minority Participation and Section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act, 63 N.Y.U. L. REv. 449, 459 (1988).
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Act,' 7 and the references to protections of political participation throughout
the Act itself all illustrate this congressional intent.' s
The restrictions on legislators' speech rights deny language minorities
equal opportunity to be active and influential participants in the political pro-
cess. Of course, the restrictions do not per se prevent a language minority
from casting a ballot. However, government-imposed language barriers do
cause the "disproportionate effect of purging laws on non-English speaking
citizens. '  For example, if a language minority appeared at a PTA,
veterans, or union meeting in order to share opinions and information with a
legislator, the legislator would be prohibited either from responding to
concerns or acknowledging that the constituent's concerns were heard."l
Language minority constituents would be denied opportunities to negotiate
with an incumbent legislator in the days before and following an election,
when voters traditionally vie for recognition of their positions. 9' Language
minorities would also be denied equal opportunity to effectively lobby at the
capitol. These activities, along with countless others, constitute political par-
ticipation. Each activity affects the outcome of legislation and the ability to
make an informed choice at the polls. The restrictions on legislators' speech
would give language majorities an upper hand in influencing legislation and
cause language minorities to arrive at the -polls on unequal footing, if they
arrived at all.
For almost fifteen years the Court has focused on applying § 2 to
districting arrangements. 2 This approach began with Thornburg, the case in
which the Court interpreted the 1982 Voting Rights Act amendments for the
first time.'93 An interesting omission from the Thornburg opinion is a
discussion of § 2's application to political participation outside the districting
context. Following Thornburg, the Court continued to abstain from this
discussion.'94 Existing case law, however, does not preclude unique claims
by language minorities. Rather, language minority claims of first impression
present courts with the opportunity to honor legislative intent and recognize
the viability of a § 2 claim outside a districting context.' g'
187. Id. According to Abrams each case Congress relied on-White, 412 U.S. 755; Zimmer,
485 F.2d 1297; Kirksey, 554 F.2d 139--emphasized the importance of political opportunity both
before and after an election. See Abrams, supra note 186, at 459.
188. See supra notes 71-85 and accompanying text. The Senate record states that "[s]ection 2
protects the fight of minority voters to be free from election practices, procedures, or methods,
that deny them the same opportunity to participate in the political process as other citizens enjoy."
S. REP. No. 97-417, at 28 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 206.
189. S. REP. No. 94-295, at 25 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 774, 791.
190. See Abrams, supra note 186, at 489.
191. Id.
192. See, e.g., Shaw v. Hunt, 116 S. Ct. 1894, 1905 (1996); Johnson v. De Grandy, 114 S. Ct.
2647, 2651 (1994); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 655 (1993). Litigants most often,bring § 2
claims not as individuals but as members of an identifiable group (i.e. race or language minority).
See Abrams, supra note 186, at 453-54. Vote dilution claims under § 2 provide relief when the
voting arrangement at issue makes the votes or political participation of minority group members
less effective. Id. at 454.
193. Thornburg, 478 U.S. at 34.
194. See Montero v. Meyer, 13 F.3d 1444 (10th Cir. 1994).
195. See Su Sun Bai, Comment, Affirmative Pursuit of Political Equality for Asian Pacific
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In context, therefore, the amendment violates the Voting Rights Act. First,
the amendment disproportionately and severely affects language minorities'
opportunities in the electoral process. Second, the restrictions require a lack of
responsiveness by elected officials.
2. Article XXVIII Facially Violates the Voting Rights Act
The amendment specifically proclaimed English to be the official
language of the ballot.'96 Yet the amendment did not specifically allow the
usage of non-English languages in order to comply with the Voting Rights
Act.'97 Therefore, the amendment facially violates the provision of the Act
which requires bilingual voting materials.
The amendment included a disclaimer that a non-English language may be
used to avoid violating federal law.' Yet, at the same time, the amendment
specifically declared English as the official language of the ballot and required
the legislative branch and all of its officials to act only in English.' If the
amendment intended to abide by the Voting Rights Act, it should have specifi-
cally stated this exception along with the four others listed in the amendment.
Without further clarification, the amendment becomes too difficult to apply in
its current form or renders a large part of the amendment obsolete.
Furthermore, because the amendment did not contain a severability clause,
under the overbreadth doctrine it is entirely unconstitutional.2'
Government constructed obstacles to language minorities' political
participation are illegal and unfair. Requiring equal opportunity is not the same
as compelling elected officials to speak foreign languages.2"' Finding the
amendment in violation of the Voting Rights Act does not create an
affirmative right. Instead, it honors the principle that each person deserves an
equal opportunity to participate in the political process.
D. Equal Protection
The court also should have found that Article XXVIII unconstitutionally
violated the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause.' 2 The court
recognized the validity of a Fourteenth Amendment approach when it stated
Americans: Reclaiming the Voting Rights Act, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 731, 764-65 (1991).
196. See ARiz. CONsT. art. XXVIII, § 1(2).
197. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1994).
198. ARIZ. CONST. art. XXVIII, § 3(2)(b).
199. Id. §§ 1,3.
200. See supra notes. 116-38 and accompanying text.
201. See Yniguez IV, 69 F.3d at 937 (explaining that the state could neither order a
government official to speak a foreign language nor preclude an elected official from discussing
official state business to constituents in whatever language she sees fit). A California election
candidate filed suit claiming that the Voting Rights Act violated his First Amendment rights
because he was required to translate his election speech into Spanish before sending it to voters.
Reich v. Larson, 695 F.2d 1147, 1148 (9th Cir. 1983). The trial court dismissed his claim for lack
of jurisdiction and the appellate court affirmed. Id. at 1149-51. However, the suit illustrates that
even a candidate's election statement is considered to be a significant component of the political
and electoral process.
202. Yniguez IV, 69 F.3d at 940.
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that Article XXVIII's equal protection ramifications strongly supported its
ruling.20 3 A ruling based upon the equal protection doctrine would have
legally recognized one of the amendment's most unjust applications, its dis-
criminatory impact on national origin groups. In fact, the court stated that the
real issue of the case was that the amendment "drastically affects not only
public employees but also countless Arizonans who need desperately to com-
municate with their government."2 4
Unfortunately, the court's handling of the amendment's equal protection
ramifications was superficial and misguided. The court did not note how the
amendment adversely affected non-English speakers, specifically Latinos, until
their cursory mention in its conclusion.0 5 Furthermore, the court misdirected
its analysis when it discussed the amendment's unconstitutional application to
non-English speaking populations based on the "right to receive" 2" doctrine
instead of the equal protection doctrine.
The premise underlying an equal protection challenge is that language
serves as a proxy for national origin. Courts have sustained equal protection
challenges to language discrimination as a proxy for suspect class
discrimination in various contexts. 7 The language restrictions in the
amendment do not per se denote disparate treatment against a particular group,
because the amendment applies equally to English and non-English
speakers.2' Facially neutral laws are subject to rationality review instead of
strict scrutiny.2' However, the Supreme Court has held that facially neutral
laws command strict scrutiny when: (1) they are sufficiently linked to a
203. See id.
204. Id. at 940 n.24.
205. Id. at 947 (stating that "Article XXVIII's overbreadth is especially egregious because it
is not uniformly spread over the population, but falls almost entirely upon Latinos and other
national origin minorities").
206. Id. at 940 n.24; see also Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, 425 U.S. 748, 756-57 (1976) (defining the "right to receive" doctrine as protecting the
communication between a willing speaker and recipient, and further stating that, in the case of a
willing speaker, the source and recipient of the communication are afforded protection as well).
The private entity "right to receive" doctrine had been adapted to the public employment context
only when a public employee speaks on matters of public concern. National Treasury Employees
Union, 115 S. Ct. at 1015.
207, See Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 363 (1991) (plurality opinion) (examining
language as proxy for race in jury selection process); Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 271 U.S. 500,
524-25 (1926) (holding that Chinese merchants were denied equal protection by a statute allowing
only English and Spanish languages to be used in account books); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390 (1923) (invalidating a language restriction statute in large part because it targeted the state's
German-American community); Olagues v. Russoniello, 797 F.2d 1511, 1520-21 (9th Cir. 1986)
(en banc) (stating that people of different ethnic groups "are often distinguished by a foreign
language"), vacated as moot, 484 U.S. 806 (1987). But see Soberal-Perez v. Heckler, 717 F.2d 36,
41 (2d Cir. 1983) (stating that Spanish speakers' lack of an affirmative right to Spanish speaking
social security notices did not constitute discrimination against Latinos), cert. denied, 466 U.S.
929 (1984); Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1980) (stating that the Equal Employment
Opportunity Act "does not support an. interpretation that equates the language an employee prefers
to use with his national origin"), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1113 (1981).
208. Garfield, supra note 91, at 706 n.72. Under Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976),
the amendment would be considered a facially neutral law.
209. See, e.g., Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1 (1988) (applying rationality review to a
facially neutral ordinance).
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suspect class, and (2) the state decisionmaker in question in part intentionally
acted to discriminate against the suspect class."'
The majority in Yniguez IV recognized that language was, in this case, a
proxy for national origin and that language restrictions can mask national
origin discrimination."' Article XXVIII's ban on non-English
communication between government employees and citizens is easily linked to
discrimination against at least one national origin group, people of Latino ori-
gin. 2 The burden of the article falls exclusively on non-English speakers,
the overwhelming majority of whom are Spanish speakers.2 3 As mentioned
above, not only are most Spanish speakers Latino, but Arizona has the fourth
highest number of Latinos in America.2 4 These objective figures prove the
inextricable link between language and national origin.
Proving that the majority of Arizona voters who approved the amendment
had a discriminatory intent is a more difficult task. Some courts have been
receptive to looking at the totality of the circumstances as proof of discrimina-
tory intent.2 5 It is clear that the amendment would have a disproportionate
impact on monolingual Spanish speakers by preventing them from receiving
vital government information and services and shutting them out of the
political process. In fact, the Amendment passed during a time of a marked
increase in immigration, a fact which may suggest that Arizonans cast votes
with discriminatory motives. 6 Furthermore, the fact that voters approved
Article XXVIII, notwithstanding an Arizona publicity pamphlet stating the
article would potentially create an inefficient and ineffective government,
21 7
shows that Arizona voters did not approve the amendment with the best
interests of their government in mind. The totality of the circumstances shows
that the amendment was passed at least in part due to discriminatory motives.
Consequently, the amendment should have received strict scrutiny."'
210. See Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265-66 (1977)
(noting that discriminatory intent must be at least one motive, not necessarily the sole motive, of a
law's passage); Washington, 426 U.S. at 240 (requiring a showing of discriminatory purpose).
211. See Yniguez IV, 69 F.3d at 947-48.
212. See Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 477-78 (1954) (recognizing that Mexicans
constitute a distinct national origin group for the purposes of an equal protection analysis).
213. Puig-Lugo, supra note 16, at 47. As mentioned above, Spanish speakers constitute the
largest group of Arizonan non-English speakers. The group of Native American Speakers, the
second largest group, is approximately one fourth the size of the number of Spanish speakers.
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. CENSUS OF POPULATION & HOUSING, 1990, Summary Tape File
3C104P28 (Washington: The Bureau 1992); see supra notes 2, 104.
214. See supra note 104.
215. See Andrew P. Averbach, Note, Language Classifications and the Equal Protection
Clause: When is Language a Pretext for Race or Ethnicity?, 74 B.U. L. REV. 481, 503 (1984).
216. See supra notes 2, 104.
217. See Yniguez IV, 69 F.3d at 961 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (discussing the Arizona publici-
ty pamphlet).
218. When a law or classification is subject to strict scrutiny, the court must find that the law
or classification is narrowly tailored to further a compelling or overriding state interest. See, e.g.,
Harper v. Blumenthal, 478 F. Supp. 176, 181 (D.D.C. 1979). It is next to impossible for the
government to meet the burden of proving that discrimination against the suspect class serves a
compelling state interest. See Garfield, supra note 91, at 707 (stating that the Supreme Court has
only upheld two laws to which it applied strict scrutiny, and noting that these laws were enacted
during wartime).
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The amendment did not further a compelling state interest. The litigating
parties stipulated that Yniguez's use of Spanish contributed to a more efficient
and effective workplace." 9 Consequently, the traditional compelling state
interest necessary to justify regulating employee speech is absent in this case.
Furthermore, the majority found an absence of a substantial connection
between a public employee's job performance and the alleged state interests of
encouraging a common language, promoting Americanism and democracy, and
protecting public confidence.22 Therefore, under a strict scrutiny analysis,
Article XXVIII violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.
Based on case authority and the aforementioned analysis by the Yniguez
IV majority, it is possible that the amendment violates the Equal Protection
Clause even under a rationality review. Although courts give great deference
to state actions when using a rationality review,22 it may be argued that the
amendment does not bear a rational relationship to any legitimate state
objectives. Courts most often uphold language classifications under a mere
rationality review based upon the state's declared interests of efficiency and
safety.222 However, in Yniguez IV, these state interests are absent.223 Also,
the court held that Article XXVII could not lawfully serve the alleged state
interest.22 ' Therefore, even giving great deference to state actions, Article
XXVIII violates the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.
CONCLUSION
The majority arrived at a legally sound and just conclusion: Article
XXVIII is "not a valid regulation of the speech of public employees." '225 The
court's approach to this conclusion, however, was misguided. Instead of appro-
priately analyzing the case as one of first impression, the court erroneously
applied the Waters/Pickering precedents. This approach distorted and confused
precedent while ignoring the amendment's most clearly unconstitutional appli-
cation: the restriction of legislators' speech rights.
By restricting legislators' speech rights and consequently compromising
language minorities' opportunities for political participation, the amendment
also violated the Voting Rights Act. Although the Supreme Court has not
provided direction for language minority plaintiffs alleging § 2 violations, the
legislative history, the language of the Act itself, and case law addressing
political participation provide support for such a claim.
Moreover, the Ninth Circuit should be commended for its recognition of
the equal protection issues implicated by the amendment. However, the court
insufficiently analyzed the amendment's discriminatory impact on national
219. Yniguez IV, 69 F.3d at 924.
220. Id. at 944-45.
221. See Garfield, supra note 91, at 706 n.68.
222. Averbach, supra note 215, at 486-87.
223. See Yniguez IV, 69 F.3d at 942. The litigants supporting the amendment have never
asserted that safety is a legitimate state issue in this case. Id.
224. Id.'at 946.
225. Id. at 947.
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origin groups. The court should have properly recognized language as a proxy
for national origin and acknowledged the amendment's disparate impact on
Latinos and other national origin groups by invalidating the amendment on
equal protection grounds.
Language restrictions are not valid attempts at maintaining a unified
nation. Restrictions on the use of non-English languages act as tools for
discrimination and result in language minorities receiving unequal and unfair
treatment. Gloria Anzaldua, a distinguished advocate for non-English speaking
populations, writes, "[w]ho is to say that robbing a people of its language is
less violent than war?
'2 26
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